










LEAKY BUCKET IN THE REAL WORLD: 







CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 2026 
CATEGORY 1: PUBLIC FINANCE 
JUNE 2007 
 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




LEAKY BUCKET IN THE REAL WORLD: 






Existing evidence of inequality aversion relies on data from class-room experiments where 
subjects face hypothetical questions. This paper estimates the magnitude of inequality 
aversion using representative survey data, with questions related to the real-economy 
situations the respondents face. The results reveal that the magnitude of inequality aversion 
can be measured in a meaningful way using survey data, but the estimates depend 
dramatically on the framing of the question. No matter how measured, the revealed inequality 
aversion predicts opinions on a wide range of questions related to the welfare state, such as 
the level of taxation, tax progressivity and the structure of unemployment benefits. 
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The conflict between efficiency and equality is at the heart of modern welfare economics. 
When (re)distribution matters, society is willing to suffer efficiency costs to obtain a more 
desirable income distribution. Recent evidence also suggests that inequality aversion or, more 
broadly, a preference for fairness, is a key determinant of human choices. For a review of this 
work, see Camerer and Fehr (2006).
1  
 
But a mere qualitative statement – that equality matters – is not very helpful in designing the 
appropriate extent of distortions the government ought to impose. For this purpose, one must 
measure what is the magnitude of inequality aversion of the people whose welfare the social 
planner wishes to maximise. The issue has been studied extensively in work on optimal in-
come taxation (eg. Tuomala, 1990 and Saez, 2002). Recently, the views on inequality aver-
sion have been at the heart of the debate on climate change. The influential Stern Review on 
the Economics of Climate Change uses a logarithmic utility function, implying an inequality 
aversion parameter equal to one on the Atkinson (1970) scale
2. Dasgupta (2006) criticises the 
Review for choosing an unacceptably small value for inequality aversion; a higher value 
would dramatically slow down the optimal emission cuts to reduce the burden on today’s 
poor. 
 
As inequality aversion cannot be directly measured, earlier work has mainly utilised a ques-
tionnaire approach for quantifying the level of inequality aversion.
3  Perhaps the most well-
known way of contrasting efficiency and equity is the ‘leaky bucket’ idea due to Okun (1975). 
An amount of money is transferred from the rich to the poor but a certain fraction of it is lost 
when doing so, for instance because of administrative costs. The extent of the loss, or leakage, 
in the transfer that society can accept determines the level of inequality aversion. The higher 
the tolerable leakage is, the more society averts inequality. Following this method, Amiel, 
Creedy and Hurn (1999) conduct experiments for groups of students from two different coun-
                                                           
1 Monkeys have also been found to prefer equal distributions (Brosnan and de Waal 2003). The preference for 
equality may thus have an early evolutionary origin. 
2 What the scale exactly means will be explained in Section 2. It is derived from the concept of relative risk aver-
sion, applied to the situation of income dispersion. 
3 An alternative approach estimates implicit social welfare functions that could give rise to observed policy 
choices, such as tax structure. See, for instance, Ahmad and Stern (1984) or Christiansen and Jansen (1978).   2
tries. They find that inequality aversion can be measured in a reasonably precise way. The 
estimated median inequality aversion is between 0.1 and 0.2, much lower than values typi-
cally used by economists in simulations. 
 
An alternative way of formalising the efficiency-equity trade-off is to present the respondents 
a choice between different income distributions in a hypothetical society. In one of the op-
tions, the mean income is low and the income dispersion small, in another the mean income is 
higher but the income distribution more dispersed. Using this approach in an experiment with 
Swedish students, Carlsson, Daruvala and Johansson-Stenman (2005) found that the median 
inequality aversion lies between 1 and 2. Their estimate was ten times larger than the one de-
duced by Amiel et al. (1999).
4  
 
The evidence above, and all the other evidence we are aware of, is obtained from experiments 
typically run among university students. As in other experimental work, it is not clear how 
well this evidence can be generalised for real populations. Even within experimental studies it 
has been shown that the composition of the participants (for example economics students vs. 
students from other disciplines) can have large effects on the estimates of inequality aversion 
(Engelman and Strobel 2004, Fehr et al. 2006). The experiments also rely on hypothetical 
situations, where the sums of money are unrelated to any real-world situation the respondents 
are familiar with.  
 
This paper attempts to contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we estimate the extent 
of inequality aversion using questionnaire data from a representative survey of Finnish peo-
ple. Second, we use questions related to real-world circumstances the respondents face. In our 
survey the leaky bucket question asks about the willingness to adjust the tax schedule so that 
those in the highest income decile pay 100 EUR more and only part of the money reaches the 
lowest decile. The wage distribution question asks the respondents to compare the existing 
Finnish wage distribution (without telling the respondents this) and alternative distributions 
with a higher mean and a larger dispersion of income.  
 
                                                           
4 This line of research has also attempted to separate risk aversion and inequality aversion. Kroll and Davidovitz 
(2003) found that in a chocolate bar game,  schoolchildren preferred an uncertain, but equal, outcome for a peer 
group as a whole as opposed to an uncertain individual-specific outcome, thus revealing a preference for equal-
ity.   3
The respondents’ choices in our survey can, of course, be determined both by their ‘true’ 
preferences for equity and their own position in society. Our second main task is to examine 
the importance of these two concerns. We first calculate the impact of the proposed alterna-
tives on the respondents’ own position and then use this measure in explaining the choices in 
inequality aversion questions. One is therefore able to compare the relative importance of the 
direct effect on the respondents themselves and a general preference for equity. In this sense, 
our paper is most closely related to the work by Beckman et al. (2003) who examine how the 
actual position of respondents affect the answers in a leaky bucket experiment.
5 
 
We present the same individuals with questions on both leaky bucket and preferred wage dis-
tribution. This allows us to compare the results of two previous approaches that have pro-
duced very different estimates of inequality aversion. On a more general level this comparison 
illustrates how a change in the framing of a question may have dramatic effects on the re-
sponses. 
 
Finally, the survey also collects information on the background of respondents, including their 
political views and income level, as well as their opinions on other policy questions related to 
the welfare state. We evaluate whether the revealed extent of inequality aversion predicts atti-
tudes towards the desirability of income transfers and tax progression. Our paper is therefore 
also related to earlier survey evidence of the support for the welfare state, such as Boeri et al. 
(2001), Corneo and Grüner (2002) and Hills (2004).  
 
While our paper deals with inequality aversion, its motivation is very similar to the work by 
Barsky et al. (1997), who measure the extent of risk aversion using survey data. Similarly to 
them, we also explain the determinants of the aversion parameter and test its validity in pre-
dicting other opinions or deeds – health behaviour in the case of risk aversion and support for 
the welfare state in the case of inequality aversion – that are related to the same economic 
sphere.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the survey and the key questions used.  
Section 3 presents the results, while Section 4 examines how the individuals’ background 
                                                           
5 However, the experiments they consider are unrelated to the circumstances in the actual society.   4
affects their choices. Section 5 looks at the role of inequality aversion as an explanatory vari-
able for opinions on the welfare state. Section 6 concludes.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
The data is based on a random sample of 3,000 Finnish people between 18 and 75 years of 
age. These individuals received a detailed questionnaire on their opinions of taxation, inequal-
ity and the welfare state. The survey was conducted by mail in the spring/summer of 2006. 
The survey instrument included specific questions on reforming the welfare state, with ‘price-
tagged’ alternatives along the lines of Boeri et al. (2001).  The survey was obviously chal-
lenging and time-consuming to fill in, and therefore the response rate was relatively low 
(45%).  
 
To account for non-random attrition in our survey, we re-weighted the data using information 
from the annual tables of the latest available Labour Force Survey 2004. We first cross-
tabulated the survey respondents according to sex, ten-year age category, education (three 
levels) and main activity (employed, unemployed, student, pensioner, other) and calculated 
the number of survey respondents in each of these 180 cells. We then created a similar cross-
classification table based on estimated population frequencies in the Labour Force Survey. 
Survey weights were calculated as a ratio of population frequencies based on estimates from 
the Labour Force survey and cell frequencies in our survey. 
 
After re-weighting the data, the gender, age, education and main activity distributions in the 
survey correspond exactly to those in the Labour Force Survey. Re-weighting therefore re-
moves any systematic bias in the responses that is due to different response rates across these 
categories. All tables and estimation results are based on the weighted data. 
 
The leaky bucket question 
 
As in much of the earlier literature, the numerical values presented to respondents were based 
on a social welfare function proposed by Atkinson (1970). This functional form represents the 
standard way of measuring inequality aversion, and therefore estimating its values using sur-













 for  1 ≠ e   
       (1) 
i x b a U ln + = , for 1 = e , 
 
where x denotes income of person i,  e refers to the extent of inequality aversion, and a ja b 
are other parameters. If e is equal to zero, the social welfare function is linear in income, and 
the income differences do not matter. When e increases, inequality aversion increases.   
 
Note that in this and the following section, we interpret the values answered by the respon-
dents as parameters of this social welfare function. We can therefore compare the survey re-
spondents’ answers to those derived in experiments in earlier literature. In Section 4, we ex-
plicitly study the importance of the respondents’ background for the answers and thus allow 
their ‘egoistic’ concerns to affect the chosen social weights. 
 
The idea in the leaky bucket question is to ask whether a transfer from those in the highest 
income decile (arranged according to disposable income) to those in the lowest decile is ac-
ceptable. To prevent dealing with equivalence scales – which must be hard for people to grasp 
– the example deals with one-person households.  
 
The maximum tolerable leakage rate (l) corresponding to each level of inequality aversion (e) 



















1 10 1  ,      (2) 
 
where  1 x  is the average income in the lowest decile and  10 x  is the average income in the 
highest decile. The actual income levels we use in the question are based on Statistics 
Finland’s Finnish Income Distribution Survey of 2003, inflated to 2006 values by the con-
sumer price index. 
   6
Since in a general questionnaire, the clarity and comprehensiveness of the question set-up are 
of key importance, we decided to ask each respondent only one question, where the loss pa-
rameter had been calculated based on one of the following values of inequality aversion: 0.5, 
1,2, and 3. These values were randomly allocated so that each value of e was used in a quarter 
of questionnaires.  For example, for the value of  1 = e , the question was the following:
6 
 
‘What is your opinion of the following reform proposal? 
 
The taxation of all high-income earners, whose disposable income exceeds 3300 EUR per month, is 
increased. The money is spent for the benefit of those low-income earners whose disposable income is 
less than 800 EUR per month. 
 
The high-income earners can, however, react to the tax increase by reducing their work effort, and 
part of the money goes to administrative expenses. Therefore, for each 100 EUR paid by the high-
income earners, only 25 EUR can be spent for the benefit of low-income earners. 
 
Are you still in favour of this proposal? 
1.  Yes 
2.  No  
3.  I do not know 
 
Table 1 below depicts the loss percentage and the EUR value the low-income earner gets for 
the different values of e. 
 
Inequality aversion  0.5  1  2  3 
Loss,  %  50% 75% 94% 98.5% 
EUR for the low-income earner  50   25  6  1.5 
 
Table 1: Loss percentages for the leaky bucket question. 
 
Once we have a large number of respondents, the distribution of the inequality aversion pa-
rameter can be estimated, even though each individual only answers a question calculated 
based on a single value for e. For example, if the majority of respondents rejects the transfer 
                                                           
6 The willingness to carry out the transfer could be different depending on what is behind the leak. This was not, 
however,  tested in this paper.   7
when the loss is calculated according to e = 3, but accepts it when e = 2, the revealed median 
inequality aversion parameter lies between 2 and 3. A logical requirement for consistency of 
responses is that when e increases, the proportion of the population supporting the transfer 
must not increase.  
 
The wage distribution question 
 
The idea in this question is to compare a more compressed wage distribution with a more dis-
persed wage distribution that has a higher average wage. The more equal distribution of the 
question resembles the real Finnish wage distribution. The distribution of pre-tax wages is 
used, since we believe that the public has a better understanding of gross rather than net 
wages. 
 
The wage distributions were derived as follows. We first fitted a log-normal distribution to 
Finnish wage distribution, based on 2003 data converted to 2006 level by the Statistics 
Finland index of wage and salary earnings. Based on this distribution, we calculated three 
wage levels, corresponding to the median and the upper threshold of the 1
st and the 9
th decile. 
We then increased the mean income level by 10 percent, and adjusted the variance so that 
someone with a given level of e would be just indifferent between the original distribution 
and the new, more unequal, distribution. With log-normal wage distribution, it can be shown 
that society is indifferent between the original distribution with mean µ  and variance 
2 σ  
with an alternative less equal distribution  ) ˆ , ˆ (
2 σ µ  if  
 
[] e / ) log( ) ˆ log( 2 ˆ
2 2 µ µ σ σ − + =      (3) 
 
Again, the alternative distribution was calculated for the same four different values of ine-
quality aversion. We used the resulting mean and variance to calculate same wage quantiles 
from this more dispersed distribution and asked the respondents which distribution they 
would prefer. Each respondent answered only one wage distribution question but the pro-
posed wage quantiles differed across respondents according to the value of e. For each re-
spondent, the value of e was the same in the wage distribution and leaky-bucket questions.   8
Therefore, we can directly compare how the type of question affects the distributional prefer-
ences.  
 
Finland is a country where centralised wage bargaining is the norm, and therefore the ques-
tion was also framed with this situation in mind. For  1 = e , the question was the following: 
 
‘Let us imagine that in wage negotiations two different alternatives are considered. Which of the fol-
lowing do you prefer? 
 
1.  If all employees are ordered from the lowest-income earner to the highest-income earner, someone 
belonging to the lowest decile earns 1570 EUR in a month, a person with average income earns 
2340 EUR and a person belonging to the highest decile earns 3480 EUR.  
2.  Income differences rise and the average income is increased so that the low-income earner gets 
1280 EUR per month, the person with average income gets 2580 EUR and the high-income earner 
5190 EUR. 
3. Cannot say. 
 
Table 2 below contains information about the log-normal estimate of the Finnish wage distri-
bution and alternative distributions used with different values of inequality aversion. 
 





with  5 . = e  
Alternative 
distribution 
with  1 = e  
Alternative 
distribution 
with  2 = e  
Alternative 
distribution 
with  3 = e  
1
st  decile  1570 1045 1280 1460 1540 
median  2340 2580 2580 2580 2580 
10
th  decile  3480 6371 5190 4560 4340 
 





The responses to the leaky bucket question, for different values of the inequality aversion pa-
rameter, are tabulated in Table 3. The responses are consistent in a sense that when the share 
of leakage (and e) goes up, the support for the transfer diminishes. Note also that the majority   9
of the respondents do not support the transfer for any values of e. This suggests that the me-
dian inequality aversion of the respondents lies below 0.5. The result is well in line with the 
findings by Amiel et al. (1999) for a similar leaky bucket question in an experimental setting. 
 
e  Yes No 
Cannot 
say 
    
0.5  29.6 36.3 34.1 
       
1  28.6 36.5 34.9 
       
2  23.1 45.5 31.4 
    
3  23.5 44.1 32.4 
    
Total  26.2 40.6 33.2 
 
Table 3: Support for the transfer in a leaky bucket question for different values of e, %. 
 
This result is in sharp contrast with the responses to the wage distribution question, reported 
in Table 4. For all values of e, the majority of the respondents prefer the more equal distribu-
tion to the alternative with higher mean and larger dispersion. Thus, based on this question, 
the median inequality aversion of the respondents is larger than 3. Answers to the wage distri-
bution question are also consistent, in the sense that the support for more equal distribution 
decreases with e. And again, this evidence is compatible with earlier work that has presented 
similar questions in an experimental setting (Carlsson et al. 2005).
7 
 
e  Yes No 
Cannot 
say 
    
0.5 71.7  8.2 20.1 
       
1 66.0  8.9  25.0 
       
2  60.7 12.5 26.8 
    
3  58.2 18.7 23.1 
    
Total  63.8 12.4 23.9 
                                                           
7 The fraction of respondents who could not answer the leaky bucket question (33%) was higher than in the wage 
distribution question (24%). On the other hand the share of non-respondents was higher in the wage level ques-
tion (8.5%) than in the leaky bucket question (2.6%). This may be partly due to the fact that the wage level ques-
tion was presented later in the questionnaire, and the respondents may have become tired in answering compli-
cated questions.   10
 
Table 4: Support for more equal wage distribution for different values of e, %. 
 
Table 5 presents a cross-tabulation of responses to the two questions. The correlation between 
the two measures of inequality aversion is positive and highly significant. However, rank cor-
relation between the two measures is not very high. This is mainly caused by the fact that 
many respondents support the compressed wage distribution but oppose transfers. 
 
 
    Supports more equal wage distribution   
   No  Cannot  say  Yes  Total 
Support  No  98 87 320  505   
transfer    19.41 17.23 63.37 100.00   
from rich  Cannot say  26  144  216  386  
to  poor    6.74  37.31 55.96 100.00   
  Yes  22 68 229  319   
    6.90  21.32 71.79 100.00   
  Total  146 299 765 1,210   
    12.07 24.71 63.22 100.00   
Pearson chi2(4) =  83.3363   Pr = 0.000 Spearman's rho =       0.0840 Kendall's tau-b =       0.0788 
 
Notes: the alternatives for each respondent are calculated using the same value for e. 
 
Table 5: Cross tabulation of the two inequality aversion questions. 
 
Several reasons for why the two different inequality questions provide different results come 
to mind. One obvious possibility is that people simply have different attitudes towards the 
efficiency-equity trade-off in different situations. In our case, it is plausible that people sup-
port a ‘fair’ wage policy but do not support unconditional transfers to those who are not work-
ing. Preferences according to which social transfers should be linked to the obligation to work 
are not captured in the leaky bucket question.
8 
 
                                                           
8 This reasoning can be linked to the idea in Alesina and Angelotos (2005), who study how redistribution is 
shaped by society’s belief in to what extent income differences are fair (related to people’s talent and effort) or 
not (owing to luck). Perhaps some of our respondents thought that income transfers to those outside the labour 
force would not be fair.   11
Second, the two questions may measure the same phenomenon but with a different scale. 
When an underlying latent preference for equality increases, one is first willing to support 
equal wage distribution, but the latent inequality preference must increase much more to trig-
ger the person to support costly transfers.  
 
Third, it may well be the case that the assumption of the constant elasticity of inequality aver-
sion is a straightjacket that distorts the inference. Indeed, Beckman et al. (2006) find that sub-
jects are inequality-averse at low-income levels, but neutral towards distribution at high-
income levels. This can have different consequences for the two questions, for example be-
cause the leaky bucket question deals with extremes of distribution.  
 
Finally, the leakage, or the efficiency loss, is very explicitly visible in the leaky bucket ques-
tion, whereas in the wage distribution question the respondent must calculate the loss behind 
the foregone wage increases. Thus preferences for efficiency might explain part of the unwill-
ingness to support the transfer.  
 
In sum, the discussion above suggests that inequality aversion can be consistently measured 
using either question on the basis of survey data, with results that are in line with earlier ex-
perimental evidence, but the two approaches yield completely different results. All this sug-
gests that the extent of inequality aversion is not a universal parameter; it exists, but it is dif-
ferent in different circumstances. 
 
4. How is inequality aversion affected by the individuals’ own position? 
 
Since the respondents are not set behind a veil of ignorance, their position in society, in par-
ticular, their income level, is likely to affect their attitudes towards inequality aversion. We 
will examine this in two ways. First, the answers are tabulated according to whether the re-
spondents themselves are winners or losers in the choice offered, given the information we 
have about their own income. Second, we estimate the relative importance of the impact of 
one’s own income and the impact on the distribution of income for the revealed choices of 
inequality aversion. 
   12
Consider first the leaky bucket question. If the transfer is carried out, those in the lowest dec-
ile win, and those in the tenth decile lose. All others’ income will remain the same. The per-
sons in the tenth decile always lose 100 euros per month, whereas the gain in the lowest decile 
depends on the extent of the leakage.  
 
The left-hand side of Table 6 reports the answers to the leaky bucket question, depending on 
whether the person loses or wins if the transfer is made. The deciles are calculated on the ba-
sis of net income in the respondents’ household. The modified OECD scale is used as an 
equivalence scale.  
 
      Supports the transfer  Supports more equal wage distribution 
Winners      
  yes 39.5  55.6 
  no 36.4  37.3 
  cannot say  24.1  7.1 
No change    
  yes 25.4  - 
  no 39.6  - 
  cannot say  35.0  - 
Losers      
 yes  10.0  61.7 
 no 75.6  20.6 
   cannot say  14.7  17.7 
 
Table 6: Results by the respondent’s own position, averaged over different values of e. 
 
As expected, support for carrying out the transfer is the highest among those who would bene-
fit from it. In fact, the majority of the winners would like to make the transfer (with 40% in 
favour, 36% inconclusive and 24% against). This holds for the smaller values of e (0.5 -1), 
whereas, for the higher values of e, a small majority of even those who would win rejects the 
transfer. In the top income group (the would-be losers), only 10% of the respondents support 
the transfer. While the impact of one’s own income for the opinions of the leaky bucket ques-
tion is strong, there are still many low-income persons who are against the transfer and some 
high-income persons who support the transfer. This suggests that other concerns than one’s 
own position also matter for the opinions. 
 
In a similar way, we calculated the change in the wage level the persons would get in the 
more equal wage distribution as opposed to the less equal wage distribution. For all wage   13
earners, the wage level changes when the wage distribution becomes more compressed, so for 
all respondents for whom we have wage information, the change is either positive or negative. 
The answers to the wage distribution question are then reported on the right-hand side of Ta-
ble 6. The support for the lower wage distribution is quite wide. The main difference is that 
among the losers, the ‘cannot say’ category is much larger than among the winners. Overall, 
attitudes about the wage level questions seem to be more dependent on other concerns than 
attitudes about the transfer question.  
 
Let us now consider in more detail the relative importance of the respondent’s own position 
and the distributional consequences for the choice revealed in the two questions. Consider the 
case where the individual can have a utility function  
 
 ) , , ( σ µ
i x u u = ,     (4) 
 
where 
i x  refers to his or her own income, µ  is the mean income in society and σ  is some 
measure of the income dispersion. The individuals can therefore care not only about their own 
income, but also what happens to others in society. Individuals may value efficiency, reflected 
by the mean income, or the distribution of income, reflected by σ . 
 
In our case we offer each individual a choice between two different societies. Since the mean 
income and income differences are tied together for each value of e, we cannot separately 
identify their effects. Given the individual’s own income, we can calculate the difference in 
their income between the two choices. Likewise, we can calculate the change in income dis-
tribution in the two societies. We can then estimate the choice probabilities using Random 
Utility Model, made famous by McFadden (1974). In our case, the probability of choosing 
society 1 over choosing society 2, i.e.  
 
 ) , , ( ) / ( 2 1 Z d dx f choice choice P
i σ = ,     (5) 
 
is a function of the change in the respondent’s own income (
i dx ), the change in the distribu-
tion ( σ d ), and some other (control) factors, Z.   
   14
We assumed that the “cannot say” -category implies indifference between the options and 
used an ordered-logit model, where the support for the transfer and the support for a more 
equal wage distribution, respectively, were explained by the change in the respondent’s own 
position and in income distribution. We used a simple measure of dispersion, the standard 
deviation of log disposable income in the leaky bucket question and the standard deviation of 
log wages in the wage level question. This measure takes only four different values that de-
pend on the four different values of e.  
 
In addition to the basic models, we also run specifications with control variables.  As addi-
tional explanatory variables we include sex, age, education, income, main activity and 
whether the respondent has a spouse and whether she/he has children at home. The explana-
tory variables also include a measure of political inclination, where respondents could depict 
their political views with a 10 point scale from left to right. We also included responses to two 
opinion questions. First, we asked (with a scale from 1 to 5) whether poverty was the fault of 
the poor and, second, whether income differences arose to a large extent from differences in 
how hard-working the person was. 
 
The results are reported in Table 7. Consider first the first two columns that refer to the leaky 
bucket question. If the person gains in terms of income from carrying out the transfer, his or 
her support of the transfer is increased. This finding confirms the role of ‘egoistic’ concerns in 
answering the question. But the persons are also willing to support the transfer more, if it 
leads to a bigger reduction in income inequality (based on the second right-hand side term), in 
particular, if other control variables are included. In addition to the selfish considerations, 
income differences therefore also matter for the choice. Another way to interpret this finding 
is that when the leakage is smaller, the willingness to carry out the transfer is larger.  
 
Things are quite different in the answers to the wage level question. There, what happens to 
the person’s own wage is not significant in explaining the opinions about the wage structure. 
The distributional concerns are, however, significant, again in particular when control vari-
ables are included. 
 
The results concerning the other variables can reveal information on what determines the 
opinions about redistribution when one already controls for the individual’s own position and   15
the efficacy of the policy to reduce income differences. Not many of these other explanatory 
variables are significant, but those which are have reasonable signs. Having high education 
reduces the support for the transfer. Students probably look forward to enjoying a better posi-
tion in society, and therefore their support for redistribution is smaller.   
 
The opinion variables turn out to be important determinants. Plausibly, the more right wing 
the respondent is, the smaller is his or her support for the income transfer or for low wage 
inequality. When one thinks that the plight of the poor is their own fault, the willingness to 
support transfers decreases. Similarly, when hard work is seen as a strong determinant of in-
come differences, the willingness to curb wage differences is reduced. It is interesting that the 
view of poverty is only significant for the opinion about the transfer, whereas the view of the 
causes of income differences is significant only for the view of wage differences.  
 
To sum up the analysis of this section, one notices that the respondent’s own position is in-
deed important for part of our analysis. But the respondents’ own position is not the sole de-
terminant of the answers; other concerns also matter, in particular, the efficiency in reducing 
income differences. Finally, political tastes and views about the source of income differences 
can explain the ‘residual’ support for equality.   16
  (1)  (2)  (3)   (4) 
  Supports  Supports  Supports   Supports 
    transfer  transfer  smaller wage  smaller wage 
    differences differences 
 
Change in own 
(log  of  )income  8.722 6.956 0.219   0.363  
  (2.63)**  (2.43)*  1.08)   (1.38)   
Reduction in income 
differences  1.440 2.156 0.187   1.864  
  (1.87)  (2.34)*  (0.29)   (2.51)*   
male    0.085    0.049 
   (0.62)    (0.28) 
age    -0.038    -0.053 
   (0.85)    (1.07) 
Age squared    0.001      0.001 
   (0.98)    (1.00) 
Has  spouse    0.027    -0.407 
   (0.15)    (1.67) 
Has children    0.016      0.189 
   (0.10)    (0.98) 
Occupational status: 
(Ref: employed) 
student    -0.732    -1.455 
   (1.92)    (2.16)* 
unemployed    0.191    -0.395 
   (0.54)    (0.65) 
retired    0.223    -0.590 
   (0.58)    (1.84) 
Education: 
(Ref: basic education) 
Secondary educ.    -0.416      0.089 
   (2.24)*    (0.37) 
Academic educ.    -1.086      -0.374 
   (4.58)**    (1.28) 
Poverty is the poor’s 
own  fault    -0.179    -0.143 
   (3.05)**    (1.88) 
Income differences 
due to hard work    -0.021      -0.146 
   (0.45)    (2.35)* 
Right-wing (scale 0 - 10)  -0.113      -0.135 
   (3.40)**    (2.93)** 
 
 
Observations  1322 1089 904    789 
 
Robust z-statistics in parentheses         
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
The number of observations is smaller in the latter two columns, since it is 
only run among respondents who have wage income     
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5. Relation to other views about the welfare state 
 
The purpose of this section is to assess to what extent inequality aversion is related to the re-
spondents’ views of the welfare state that they expressed when answering other questions in 
the survey. These relationships can be interpreted as a test of the external relevance of ine-
quality aversion questions. A similar approach has been used previously to evaluate whether 
risk aversion measured from survey data predicts risky behaviour (Barsky et al. 1997). 
 
We explained opinions on taxation and social benefits using both measures of inequality aver-
sion. Even though our questions only reveal whether inequality aversion is higher or lower 
than the threshold value of e, we can evaluate their effect by using the yes/no answers on the 
inequality aversion question as explanatory variables and including the values of e that were 
used to calculate choice options in each questionnaire as explanatory variables. 
 
The first question was: 
 
“If your home municipality has financial difficulties, should it rather increase taxes or cut 
public services?”.  
 
For ordered logit models we coded responses “cut services” as -1, “cannot say” as 0 and “in-
crease taxes” as 1.  
 
Similarly we tried to explain attitudes to increased tax progression, increased unemployment 
insurance (UI) and unemployment assistance (UA) benefits and increased income support 
always coding the respondents that preferred better benefits or higher progression as 1, re-
spondents who would like to keep the benefits at the current level as 0, and respondents who 
would like to cut benefits or reduce progression as -1. All these questions were price-tagged 
so that improved benefits required increasing taxes. We also provided information on current 
benefits and calculated the costs of changing benefits as accurately as possible. For example, 
on unemployment insurance we first told the respondents that  
 
Currently earnings-related unemployment insurance benefit for a median earner earning 
2300 euros per month is 52 per cent of previous earnings (1200 euros/month). Unemployment   18
insurance is financed by income taxes and unemployment insurance payments collected from 
both employees and employers 
  
and then asked: 
 
Should the earnings-related benefit system be changed and, if so, to which direction? 
1. Increase the benefit for the median earner by ten per cent and finance that by increasing 
income taxes. For median earners tax payments would increase by about 5 euros per 
month. 
2. Lower the benefit for the median earner by ten per cent. This would allow reducing tax 
payment of the median earner by about 5 euros per month. 
3. No, the current level is OK. 
4. Cannot say. 
  
The questions on unemployment assistance for those not eligible for unemployment insurance 
and on income support was framed in the same way adjusting the change in the tax rates so 
that the reform would be revenue-neutral, assuming no effects on behaviour. Similarly the 
question on tax progression involved explicit trade-offs between tax rates of high and low 
income earners keeping the total tax revenue constant. 
 
The results are presented in Tables 10 and 11. In Table 10 we use inequality aversion implied 
by the leaky-bucket question and in Table 11 wage compression question. For each opinion 
question (taxes vs. services, tax progression, unemployment insurance, unemployment assis-
tance, income support) we first explained the answers using only measures of inequality aver-
sion as explanatory variables and then by adding a set of demographic variables to the equa-
tion. 
 
The results indicate that measures of inequality aversion are strongly correlated with the opin-
ions on the tax and benefit question. The coefficient for the answer in the leaky bucket ques-
tion is statistically significant in seven out of ten cases and the answer on the wage compres-
sion question is significant in nine out of ten cases. Adding control variables typically reduces 
coefficients but the effect is not very large. This is rather remarkable given that the set of ad-
ditional covariates includes a number of variables strongly correlated with inequality aver-  19
sion. One could argue that, for example, the left-right dimension of political views is itself a 
measure of inequality aversion.  Therefore, the two questions on inequality aversion appear to 






Assessing the views on the efficiency-equity trade-off is important for deriving policy rec-
ommendations at the societal level and, as new research on the inherent human preference for 
fairness suggests, inequality aversion can also be instrumental in explaining individual 
choices. Existing evidence on the extent of inequality aversion is solely based on ‘classroom’ 
experiments. Yet, it is by now well-known that the background of the experiments’ subjects 
matters for the results. Therefore, it is also worth asking to what extent the experiments’ re-
sults are a reliable prediction of the behaviour of the whole population. 
 
The purpose of this paper was to examine the extent of inequality aversion using representa-
tive survey data. The questions for assessing views on inequality were related to real eco-
nomic circumstances the respondents faced in Finland in 2006. We applied two different ap-
proaches to quantify the extent of inequality aversion also used by the earlier literature – the 
leaky bucket and wage inequality.  Each respondent was asked two questions about inequality 
aversion, and the level of inequality aversion was set as the same for both questions.  
 
Our results reveal that inequality aversion could be estimated in a reliable way using survey 
data for both specific questions. For the leaky bucket type of questions, we estimated the me-
dian inequality aversion parameter to lie below 0.5 (e in Atkinson’s social welfare function). 
This is well in line with earlier evidence, such as results by Amiel at al (1999), despite the fact 
that in our survey, the respondents were not set behind a veil of ignorance. The results from 
the wage inequality type of question gave a completely opposite view about the magnitude of 
inequality aversion, with e being greater than 3. But also this result is in line with earlier evi-
dence in Carlsson et al. (2005). In this sense, our results suggest that the inequality aversion 
parameter values obtained from experiments can also be applicable for society as a whole. 
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The individuals’ answers to the two inequality aversion questions were correlated in a statisti-
cally significant way, but the rank correlation coefficient was not very large. There are a large 
number of persons who are willing to support narrow wage differences (at the expense of 
mean wage), but the same persons are not willing to carry out costly transfers from the top to 
the bottom of income distribution. Exactly why this was the case remains unclear but, at the 
very least, the results suggest that the exact extent of inequality aversion is specific to the way 
the question is framed. Obtaining universal measures to inequality aversion therefore appears 
unlikely. 
 
Finally, both measures of inequality aversion were shown to predict the respondents’ opinions 
on the proper role of the welfare state, such as the level of taxation, tax progressivity and the 
scope of unemployment benefits, even after controlling for the background of respondents, 
including their political views. However, the revealed preference for inequality that was de-
rived from the wage inequality question was a more robust determinant of opinions on the 
welfare state than the one based on the leaky bucket question. Even if the exact scale of the 
inequality aversion the two questions propose is different, they both appear to measure some-
thing meaningful for choices about economic policy. Society probably needs to apply differ-
ent parameter values for inequality aversion in different situations. 
 
It would be interesting to study some issues in more detail in future research. Additional ex-
periments could be designed to shed light on why the answers on wage inequality and leaky 
bucket questions are so different. One topic could also be to examine how the distributional 
tastes revealed here are correlated with, for instance, charitable giving at the individual level. 
Finally, conducting similar surveys in other countries can improve our understanding of the 
extent to which the preferences people state in surveys are aligned with the distributional 
policies that countries conduct. 
 
 
 Table 10 Impact of inequality aversion on opinions on taxation and benefits, ordered logit estimates 
 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)  (10) 
  Increase taxes rather 
than cut services 
Increase tax progression 
 
Increase UI benefits  Increase UA benefits  Increase income support 
Supports 0.130  0.095  1.051  0.943  0.201 0.173 0.365 0.358 0.403  0.260 
transfers (1.61)  (0.98) (10.00)**  (7.97)**  (2.22)*  (1.58) (3.90)**  (3.18)**  (4.65)** (2.54)* 
e=2  -0.313  -0.314  -0.295  -0.158  0.228 0.086 0.219 0.032 -0.113  -0.160 
  (1.71)  (1.57)  (1.30)  (0.67)  (0.97) (0.36) (1.07) (0.14) (0.62)  (0.76) 
e=3 -0.102  -0.111  0.223  0.107  0.135  -0.150  0.333  0.263  0.236  0.132 
  (0.58)  (0.55)  (0.99)  (0.44)  (0.67) (0.66) (1.61) (1.19) (1.20)  (0.60) 
e=4 -0.166  -0.138  0.086  0.281  0.131  -0.177  -0.016  0.018  0.061  0.083 
  (0.95)  (0.68)  (0.38)  (1.14)  (0.66) (0.86) (0.08) (0.08) (0.31)  (0.39) 
male    -0.181    -0.547    -0.155   -0.040   0.138 
    (1.20)    (2.98)**    (0.92)   (0.24)   (0.88) 
age 25 - 34    0.146    0.900    0.073    0.495    -0.178 
    (0.47)    (2.40)*    (0.19)   (1.18)   (0.51) 
age 35 - 44    -0.007    0.986    0.251    0.462    0.320 
    (0.02)    (2.75)**    (0.75)   (1.13)   (0.92) 
age 45 - 54    -0.067    1.039    0.073    0.963    0.263 
   (0.22)    (2.74)**    (0.20)    (2.27)*    (0.73) 
age 55 - 64    0.157    1.240    -0.098    0.705    0.533 
    (0.48)    (3.19)**    (0.27)   (1.59)   (1.41) 
age >= 65     0.231    1.138    -0.439    0.559    0.006 
    (0.51)    (2.15)*    (0.94)   (0.97)   (0.01) 
log(income)    0.098    -0.576    -0.152   -0.133   -0.029 
    (0.65)    (2.56)*    (0.79)   (0.85)   (0.20) 
Unemployed    -0.022    1.403    0.140   0.721   0.903 
    (0.05)    (1.92)    (0.23)   (1.68)   (2.34)* 
Pension    0.033    -0.038    -0.080   -0.438   0.252 
    (0.10)    (0.11)    (0.27)   (1.22)   (0.68) 
Student    0.179    -1.176    -0.145   -0.213   0.629 
    (0.46)    (2.48)*    (0.36)   (0.43)   (1.34) 
Other    -0.724    -0.436    0.850   0.702   0.136 
    (1.63)    (1.03)    (1.37)   (1.13)   (0.37) 
Secondary      -0.146    -0.033    -0.313   -0.090   -0.129 
education   (0.75)    (0.14)    (1.38)   (0.38)   (0.59) 
Acdemic    -0.076    -0.772    -0.326   -0.118   -0.155 
education   (0.31)    (2.87)**    (1.15)   (0.45)   (0.58) 
Right-wing      -0.205    -0.110    -0.131   -0.187   -0.202 
scale  0-10    (5.45)**    (2.33)*    (3.31)**   (4.58)**   (4.93)** 
Observations  1263  995  1022  817  944 784 966 785 1023  843 
                 
 
Robust z statistics in parentheses * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   22
Table 11 Impact of inequality aversion on opinions on taxation and benefits, ordered logit estimates 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  Increase taxes rather 




Increase UI benefits  Increase UA benefits  Increase income support 
Supports  0.507 0.462 0.759 0.726 0.263 0.245 0.350 0.249 0.445 0.300 
wage 
compression 
(5.07)** (4.13)** (6.57)** (5.44)** (2.46)*  (2.14)*  (3.33)** (1.94)  (4.01)** (2.51)* 
e=2  -0.237 -0.293 -0.103 -0.080 0.234  0.132  0.234  0.102  -0.093 -0.230 
  (1.22) (1.39) (0.46) (0.33) (0.98) (0.55) (1.11) (0.45) (0.49) (1.04) 
e=3  0.042 -0.034  0.161 0.072 0.147 -0.104  0.287 0.252 0.220 0.039 
  (0.22) (0.16) (0.74) (0.30) (0.72) (0.45) (1.36) (1.12) (1.11) (0.17) 
e=4  -0.007  -0.038  0.212 0.245 0.181 -0.140  0.022 0.050 0.109 0.014 
  (0.04) (0.18) (0.96) (1.02) (0.91) (0.67) (0.10) (0.21) (0.52) (0.06) 
male    -0.184   -0.505   -0.127   -0.017   0.157 
   (1.19)    (2.71)**    (0.75)    (0.10)    (0.98) 
age 25 - 34    0.224    0.819    0.040    0.466    -0.244 
   (0.70)    (2.03)*    (0.11)    (1.11)    (0.68) 
age 35 - 44    0.150    0.880    0.201    0.489    0.200 
   (0.51)    (2.29)*    (0.59)    (1.18)    (0.55) 
age 45 - 54    0.089    0.983    0.042    0.986    0.183 
   (0.29)    (2.42)*    (0.11)    (2.30)*    (0.48) 
age 55 - 64    0.177    1.302    -0.146    0.680    0.447 
   (0.54)    (3.10)**    (0.41)    (1.52)    (1.14) 
age >= 65     0.278    1.060    -0.759    0.284    -0.031 
    (0.58)   (1.81)   (1.61)   (0.47)   (0.06) 
log(income)    0.043    -0.748   -0.164   -0.154   -0.091 
   (0.28)    (3.58)**    (0.84)    (0.95)    (0.58) 
Unemployed    -0.013    1.128   0.149   0.791   0.962 
    (0.03)   (1.63)   (0.24)   (1.70)   (2.50)* 
Pension    0.215   0.033   0.045   -0.267    0.296 
    (0.59)   (0.09)   (0.15)   (0.69)   (0.74) 
Student   0.273    -1.318   -0.143   -0.235   0.432 
   (0.70)    (2.96)**    (0.37)    (0.47)    (0.92) 
Other   -0.591    -0.396    0.859    0.748    0.039 
    (1.17)   (0.82)   (1.46)   (1.32)   (0.10) 
Secondary      -0.137   -0.200   -0.337   -0.183   -0.159 
education    (0.70)   (0.82)   (1.46)   (0.74)   (0.67) 
Academic    -0.001   -0.986   -0.328   -0.205   -0.199 
education   (0.00)    (3.58)**   (1.15)    (0.75)    (0.71) 
Right-wing      -0.195   -0.105   -0.115   -0.188   -0.199 
scale 0-10    (5.10)**    (2.31)*    (2.95)**    (4.58)**    (4.79)** 
Observations  1193  947 960 777 933 779 954 781 978 808 
Robust z statistics in parentheses  * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%  
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